This article explores the theoretical and behavioral impact of conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration (FOA) when parties are bargaining over an uncertain value. In this context, one player receives a fixed payment while the other player receives the uncertain residual. Although both forms of arbitration have identically sized contract zones, we show theoretically that in FOA the contract zone shifts in favor of the residual claimant. In addition, as the variance of the possible values rises, the contract zone shifts further in favor of the residual claimant. In laboratory testing, the contract zone roughly reflects the central tendencies of behavior; however, both forms of arbitration increase conflict relative to a no-arbitration baseline. This is caused by residual claimants being more aggressive when arbitration is available while fixed-payment recipients are not. However, both parties play a role in the conflict escalation due to the increased proposal variation.
Introduction
Arbitration is an increasingly used alternative mechanism for resolving disputes in the face of costly litigation. Historically, labor disputes have been the most common type of disagreements to be settled via arbitration mechanisms. In fact, the Supreme Court recently ruled that employers can force employees to use arbitration rather than litigation to solve employment disputes. However, given the restrictions on discovery, live testimony, and hearing length, arbitration can generate large savings relative to standard litigation in many circumstances (Bernstein 1993) . For example, Apple Computer saved over $4 million in legal fees in a case with the Internal Revenue Service in addition to preventing the revelation of proprietary information, which would have occurred in standard litigation (Fuller 1993) . Moreover, Tax Rule 124 permits any factual issue to be decided via voluntary binding arbitration rather than litigation. Regardless of the specific arbitration procedure in place, when both players have symmetric information regarding the outcome in arbitration, it is in their best interest to settle and save their respective arbitration costs. These costs create a contract zone within which both parties prefer to settle rather than pursue arbitration. Largely, the arbitration literature focuses on the existence of the contract zone and optimal bidding behavior once players reach arbitration. However, as long as information is symmetric, prearbitration settlement is predicted. Despite this prediction, real-world disputes are frequently settled by arbitration. In the standard framework, the arbitration procedure is a constant-sum game; there is some surplus to be divided between the parties. Previous work in this area has relied on uncertainty about what choice the arbitrator will make and some asymmetric information regarding some piece of information (usually the level of damages or the probability of liability) to explain why strategic behavior impedes settlement.
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Two seminal studies in this area include those of Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) , which develop screening and signaling models, respectively. Alternatively, optimism about one's position could cause one side to hold out for a more extreme settlement, see Shavell (1982) , Neale and Bazerman (1985) , and Farber and Bazerman (1989) . Recently, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Dickinson (2006) have found experimental evidence of self-serving biases in the laboratory while Farmer et al. (2004) found empirical evidence of optimism causing settlement failure in baseball negotiations. In the case of strikes, reputation building in a repeated game provides a rational explanation for seemingly irrational behavior (Farmer and Pecorino 1998a) . This, however, relies on repeated play to generate bargaining failure with symmetric information. Outside of the economics literature, scholars examine a number of bargaining impasses, such as ego and power, that do not rely on asymmetric information as an explanation for negotiation failure. 2 This article introduces a different form of uncertainty that also does not involve an informational asymmetry. Specifically, we consider the situation in which the two parties do not know the value of what is at stake, a situation that replicates the employer/employee relationship more closely than the standard 1. See Farmer and Pecorino (1996) for a survey. 2. See, for example, Rubin et al. (1994) , Arrow et al. (1995) , Bazerman et al. (1998) , and Gibson et al. (1994) for discussions of conflict escalation and the role of rationality in negotiations. Specifically, Neale et al. (1988) , Bazerman (1991, 1992) , and Pinkley et al. (1995) consider factors such as the ability to process information, ego, and sunk costs as potential barriers. Other factors such as individual differences (Rubin and Brown 1975) , perceptions of fairness (Thompson and Lowenstein 1992; Wade-Benzoni et al. 1997) , and power issues related to gender or culture (Kolb and Coolidge 1991; Watson 1994 ) are all important behavioral issues related to bargaining failure in the face of symmetric information.
constant-sum game. Consider the example of Major League Baseball. At the time the player and the team negotiate the player's salary, neither side knows what type of year the player will have and hence how much the player will contribute to the value of the franchise. If the player turns out to be an all-star, there is more value to be divided than if the player has a mediocre season. Therefore, the payoff to the team from a given wage is a lottery while the payoff to the player is fixed.
3 As any employment negotiation will fit this description, the discussion is couched in terms of a worker and a firm negotiating a wage, but other contexts apply as well. When a partner is being bought out of a business, it is unclear what the future value of the asset will be; one party receives a fixed payment while the other takes the residual and bears the risk. Buying a house or bargaining over custody of children are other examples in which agents may bargain in the face of uncertainty regarding the future value (or utility) of the asset.
Complicating the issue further is the variety of arbitration formats available. 4 Among the most commonly used forms are conventional arbitration (CA), in which the arbitrator is free to make the ruling as he or she sees fit, and final-offer arbitration (FOA), in which an arbitrator must choose between final offers submitted by each party. 5 It is widely understood that the form of arbitration can generate different incentives for strategic bidding by the parties to the dispute. Given the increasing importance of arbitration as an alternative to costly litigation, it is critical to understand the role that the type of arbitration plays in encouraging self-negotiated settlements in different settings. Through our theoretical and laboratory work in this environment, we gain new insights into why parties may fail to reach mutually beneficial settlements and rely on arbitration or alternatively go on strike.
Early scholarly work was concerned with the ''chilling effect'' of arbitration because it provided a safer fallback to failed negotiations than a strike would provide (Long and Feuille 1974; Feuille 1975; Wheeler 1975 Wheeler , 1978 . Moreover, CA was considered to be inferior to FOA in this regard because it provides more of a safety net than FOA in which the arbitrator must choose more extreme outcomes. Initially, scholars believed that FOA would generate 3. An alternative means to handle this type of uncertainty is with contingency contracts. However, to the extent that complete contracting is overly costly or even impossible, the analysis in this article applies. In Major League Baseball, where performance is measurable relative to other forms of employment, contingency contracts are utilized in only 18% of cases (Clayton and Yermack 2004) . Although this can mitigate the effects of performance uncertainty, it clearly does not eliminate the issue.
4. See Farmer and Pecorino (2003) for a theoretical treatment of the different settlement incentives created by alternative arbitration mechanisms under asymmetric information and Pecorino and Van Boening (2004) for an experimental analysis.
5. Other forms of arbitration which are variations of CA or FOA include trioffer arbitration in which an independent third party also submits a final offer and the arbitrator may choose among the three offers (Ashenfelter et al. 1992) , combined arbitration in which the arbitrator follows the rules of FOA if his or her belief falls between the two offers and employs CA otherwise (Brams and Merrill 1986) , and amended final offer in which the payout to the winner is determined by the extremity of the losing party's bid (Zeng 2003). more sincere offers and generate greater self-negotiated settlement (Feuille 1975; Notz and Starke 1978, 1981; Neale and Bazerman 1983) . 6 However, in an early field study, Crawford (1979) found no evidence that FOA produces more settlement than CA. In the laboratory, both Ashenfelter et al. (1992) and Dickinson (2004) found significant amounts of disagreement and that FOA actually generated more conflict than did CA.
In addition to considering the theoretical properties of bargaining with FOA, CA, and a no-arbitration (NoA) baseline under symmetric uncertainty about what is at stake, this article also provides a laboratory investigation of these mechanisms. In field studies, it is not possible to control for the information structure, which includes knowledge about the arbitrator, the cost of arbitration, and the distribution of potential gains from a firm hiring a worker. However, these factors can be manipulated in the laboratory. As described by Smith (1994, 115) , we can compare institutions by ''Using identical environments, but varying the . . . rules of exchange . . ..'' It is worth noting that previous laboratory work on arbitration has focused on the case of asymmetric information. Ashenfelter et al. (1992) and Dickinson (2004) both intentionally introduce asymmetries in their experiments in order to ensure settlement failure. Pecorino and Van Boening (2004) use asymmetric information to study the role of renegotiation after the submission of offers in FOA. However, this article steps back from those studies and analyzes settlement rates in the absence of asymmetric information. In addition to comparing settlement rates across arbitration procedures, we investigate the position of the contract zone and the implied welfare effects as well as the actual bidding behavior and outcomes in each case. This allows us to more completely understand both the strategic incentives and observed behavior given the form of symmetric uncertainty that we introduce.
Finally, there is a debate within the literature as to whether a larger contract zone allows more room for agreement, thereby promoting greater settlement or whether the fact that a smaller contract zone tightens the range over which subjects will bargain is more conducive to settlement. Since theory cannot inform this question and standard empirical analysis cannot identify the size of the contract zone, the question remains untested. A laboratory experiment is an ideal controlled setting to investigate how the contract zone size affects settlement. In our experiments, we find that the larger contract zone produces greater settlement.
The next section develops a formal theoretical model of bargaining behavior under CA and FOA, as well as NoA, when there is symmetric uncertainty about the total amount to be divided. A separate section then compares the theoretical predictions of the dispute mechanisms. Section 4 gives the design 6. Game-theoretic bidding incentives in FOA were first studied by Farber (1980) ; follow-up analyses were studied by Brams and Merrill (1983) , Faurot and McAllister (1992) , and Pecorino (1998b, 2003); and Miller (2000) examined additional issues such as the shape of the arbitrator's distribution of preferences, risk aversion of the players, and renegotiation after the bids have been submitted. of controlled laboratory experiments for evaluating the dispute resolution techniques. Section 5 gives the experimental results and compares observed behavior to the theoretical predictions of the model. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
Theoretical Model
Consider a risk-neutral worker and a risk-neutral firm bargaining over the worker's wage. 7 The employment of the worker generates some total value to the employer who retains the residual surplus after having paid the worker. Define w to be the wage payment. Now, suppose that the total value available to be allocated between the two players is uncertain and that neither player is informed about the true amount until the negotiations are complete. If negotiations fail, the dispute may be settled by an arbitrator, whose preferences for the allocation of this uncertain value are also unknown.
The costs of arbitration generate a contract zone within which both parties would prefer to settle rather than proceed to arbitration. Although theory suggests that the simple existence of a contract zone is sufficient to ensure settlement, in practice, there is a presumption that the larger the contract zone, the greater the joint gains of settlement and, therefore, the greater the probability of settlement. However, it has been suggested that this generates greater room for disagreement, making it more difficult to settle on a mutually beneficial solution (Bloom 1981) . Although theory does not inform the relationship between contract zone size and settlement, what is clear is that settlement should take place within it; thus, its position has implications for the distribution of settlement outcomes.
In the following analysis, we examine the bargaining behavior of these two players under three alternative dispute resolution structures: NoA, CA, and FOA. In each case, the size and position of the contract zone, optimal bidding behavior, and expected profits for each player are considered.
The basic structure of the game is as follows:
0. The firm and the worker observe two possible values (high and low) generated by the worker's employment. Denote these two amounts as v H and v L , where v H > v L , and v H has a probability p of being the true value. Neither player knows the truth. 1. In the first round of bargaining, the worker and firm submit an offer; the worker asks for a wage a while the firm submits a wage offer, or bid for the labor, denoted b. 2. Nature determines the true amount of money available to be either v H or v L . 3. If the players' bids are compatible, that is, if b ! a, then the worker receives w ¼ (a þ b)/2 while player 2 receives a residual surplus equal 7. In this market for labor, a firm is buying labor, whereas a worker is selling it. Following the literature on markets and experiments, a price at which a seller is willing to sell is referred to as an ask price, whereas a bid refers to the price at which a buyer is willing to buy.
to either v H ÿ w or v L ÿ w depending on the result in stage 2. Note that it is possible for the firm to receive a negative payment. If the bids are incompatible, the game proceeds to stage 4. 4. The allocation, w, is determined via a mechanism for dispute resolution.
In the following sections, three possible alternatives that will define this stage are considered.
No Arbitration
If NoA is available, then stage 4 appears as follows.
4#. If the two players submit incompatible bids in stage 3, both receive a payout of zero 8 and the game ends.
Given that NoA alternative exists and both players expect to earn zero in stage 4, both are willing to accept any positive expected payout in round 1. For the worker this implies that any bid above zero would be acceptable. The firm is willing to make any offer that does not exceed the expected amount of money to be allocated which is pv H þ (1 ÿ p)v L . Thus, the contract zone in this case is the entire range [0,
. Any wage within that range is a Nash equilibrium outcome.
The wage agreement can lie anywhere within this range.
Conventional Arbitration
If bids in round 1 are incompatible, an arbitrator will decide the allocation. Not only do the players not know the true value but also they do not know how the arbitrator will choose to allocate the total value between the two players. Rather, the amount the arbitrator chooses for the worker to be compensated, defined as Y, has a known distribution, and both players have identical beliefs concerning that distribution. Given the rules of CA, w ¼ Y. Define f H to be the distribution of Y when the true value is v H and f L to be the distribution of arbitrator's preferences for Y when the true value is v L . So, Y ; f H (0, v H ) with probability p and Y ; f L (0, v L ) with probability 1 ÿ p. Further, arbitration is assumed to be costly. Let c w and c f denote the costs of proceeding to arbitration for the worker and the firm, respectively. Now stage 4 becomes 4$. 4$. The arbitrator determines the allocation w based on his preferences. The worker receives w ÿ c w and the firm receives either v H ÿ w ÿ c w or v L ÿ w ÿ c f with probability p and 1 ÿ p, respectively. 8. In practice, the players would each receive the payoff associated with their next best payoff, which for simplicity is normalized to 0.
9. The arbitrator is assumed to have preferences that are independent of the bids of the players. In baseball, for example, the arbitrators' guidelines explicitly state that bids are not to be used as a factor in making a final ruling. However, Gibbons (1988) , among others, has demonstrated that this independence may not always exist.
From the players' perspectives, they choose their wage proposals based on a belief that the true distribution is f H with probability p and f L with probability 1 ÿ p regardless of whether or not the arbitrator knows the true value. If he knows the truth, then his preferences are distributed according to f H or f L . If the arbitrator does not have any more information than the players, the arbitrator's preferences will be drawn from convolution f H and f L . Either way, from the perspective of the player, the decision is the same. Since the theoretical implications are independent of this assumption, for ease of exposition the arbitrator is assumed to know the true value of the worker.
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What will be the players' optimal bidding strategy in round 1 given that CA is the dispute resolution mechanism that will follow? If players end up in arbitration, the expected value of w will be pl H þ (1 ÿ p)l L , where l H and l L are the means of the distribution f H and f L , respectively. The worker's expected payout in arbitration is pl H þ (1 ÿ p)l L ÿ c w while the firm expects to receive
Thus, a firm is willing to offer as much as
Result 2. When CA is the dispute resolution mechanism, the contract zone in round 1 is
Note that the size of the contract zone is the sum of the arbitration costs c w þ c f , and, assuming the expected pie size exceeds the total arbitration cost, the contract zone under CA is smaller than the contract zone when NoA is available.
Final-Offer Arbitration
In FOA, the arbitrator is forced to choose between two final-offer bids submitted by each player. There is no freedom to split the difference or choose some middle ground. Thus step 4 is replaced with 4$#. 4$#. The worker and firm submit final proposals a and b, respectively. The arbitrator chooses the proposal that lies closer to his preferred valuation, denoted Y; recall that from the bargainers' perspectives the arbitrator's valuation is drawn from distribution f H with probability p and from f L with probability 1 ÿ p. Thus, w ¼ a or w ¼ b, and the worker receives w ÿ c w while the firm receives either
10. It is a standard assumption in the law and economics literature that the arbitrator (or judge or jury in a litigation setting) is informed. Usually, these models involve asymmetric information on the part of the players, and the arbitrator has the information, which is possibly gained through the course of the hearings. Although the context of this article differs, we choose to frame our problem in a consistent fashion in order to draw parallels. Moreover, given risk neutrality, our model is strategically equivalent to one in which the arbitrator is uninformed and simply draws from the given distribution and then implements the solution based upon that draw. The arbitrator's decisions rule is to choose
, the firm wins with probability F L ((a þ b)/2).
11 Given this decision rule, the players' optimal bids in stage 4$# can be found from the optimization of equations (1a) and (1b). The worker maximizes expected payout (equation 1a), and the firm attempts to minimize this payout (equation 1b):
Both players will choose their bids to maximize their expected profits in this round. Given the bid/ask pair, substitution back into equations (1a) and (1b) and subtracting their respective arbitration costs provides the expected profit each player can expect if they should happen to reach FOA. Denoting these profits as p w * and p f * , one can compute the contract zone for optimal bids in stage 1.
Result 3. When FOA is the dispute mechanism, the contract zone is ½p w * ÿ c w ; p w * ÿ c f .
Arbitration Mechanisms Compared
For all distributions, if the expected pie size exceeds the total arbitration cost, NoA has the largest contract zone while CA and FOA both have contract zones the size of the sum of arbitration costs. This represents the surplus available to both parties from reaching a self-negotiated settlement. However, to generate explicit predictions regarding bidding behavior and expected profits, some specificity in terms of the distributions f H and f L must be assumed. For this theoretical treatment as well as the experimental design that follows, these distributions are assumed to be uniform. 11. The arbitrator's decision is modeled along the lines of Farber (1980) . F i denotes the cumulative density function for f i .
12. It is the experimental investigation that drives our choice of distributional forms. A uniform distribution can be explained more simply to a layperson than can a normal distribution. The general theoretical findings are robust to the distributional form; see Appendix A.
Using these distributions, reconsider the Results 1-3 above. Note first that Result 1 remains unaffected. Result 2 can simply be rewritten as follows.
Result 2#. When CA is the dispute resolution mechanism and the arbitrator's value is drawn from a uniform distribution for each of the true values, the contract zone in round 1 is
In CA both players expect to receive a final profit of pv H /2 þ (1 ÿ p)v L /2 less their arbitration costs. In other words, they expect to simply split the expected value of employment. Now consider FOA. Given uniform distributions over f H and f L , equations (1a) and (1b) are rewritten below:
Maximization of equations (2a) and (2b) yields optimal bids in equation (3):
there is no uncertainty regarding the value of the worker, and the worker should ask for the upper bound of the distribution. Since the lower bound is known, the firm will always bid zero. This finding is consistent with previous work that has shown that when the arbitrator's value is distributed uniformly, players in FOA will push their bids to the extreme of the distribution (Farmer and Pecorino 1998b) . Given that the worker's strategy under perfect information would be to ask for the upper bound, it might seem that in the face of uncertainty, the worker should ask for the expected value of the upper bounds; note, however, that this is not the case. 13. Note that when p ¼ 0.5, the worker's request is declining in the variations between v H and v L . Let the expected value equal k and let
From this it follows that the worker's bid is declining in d.
Plugging optimal bids from equation (3) into equation (1), the expected profits are as follows:
This allows Result 3 to be rewritten with more specificity.
Result 3#. When FOA is the dispute resolution mechanism and the arbitrator's preferences are distributed according to the uniform distribution, the contract zone in round 1 is
An observant reader will notice that this value describes the median of the distribution, which is the convolution of f H and f L with weights p and 1 ÿ p, respectively. It is generally true that regardless of the shape of the distribution, the contract zone in FOA will be centered about the median, a result that was first demonstrated by Brams and Merrill (1983) . See Appendix A for the derivations. This is in clear contrast to the finding that CA produces a contract zone that is centered about the mean. Thus, in comparing the two arbitration mechanisms, one can see that although both produce a contract zone of equal sizes, the locations will differ. Consequently, one would expect to see different optimal bidding behaviors across arbitration mechanisms and ultimately players' profits should be affected as well. Under uniform assumption, 14 when v H ¼ v L , or alternatively, p ¼ 0 or p ¼ 1, both contract zones are identical: they both collapse to [v H /2 ÿ c w , v H /2 þ c f ]. In other words, when there is a fixed value to be allocated and information is complete, both mechanisms lead to an expected even split of the worker's value. Risk-neutral players will settle within the range generated by the sum of their arbitration costs; if arbitration costs are identical, this range is centered around an even split of the value of the worker. However, when both players have uncertainty with regard to the true value of the worker, this no longer holds true. In fact, it is easily shown that the contract zone always shifts to the left. This result is shown in Proposition 1.
with probabilities p and 1 ÿ p, respectively, the endpoints of the contract zone under FOA are lower than when CA is used for all p 2 (0,1).
Proof. It is easily shown that pv
n In other words, the bargaining range favors the firm in FOA as compared to CA. This can be shown by simply comparing equation (4b) with equation (4a).
14. This actually holds more generally for symmetric distributions.
As stated above, if p 2 f0,1g or if v H ¼ v L , then the contract zones are identical for FOA and CA. Since the contract zone in FOA is centered around the median as opposed to the mean which is the case for CA, this results hinges on the fact that the median lies to the left of the mean. The distribution that determines the position of the contract zone is the convolution of f H and f L with weights p and 1 ÿ p, respectively. Since the lower values that lie within [0, v L ] have weight in each of the two distribution but the values within [v L , v H ] only occur with probability 1 ÿ p, there is a greater frequency of outcomes in the lower portion of the final distribution. Hence, FOA never strictly favors the worker. It should not be surprising, therefore, that FOA results in higher expected profits for the firm.
If FOA favors firms when the employee's value is unknown, how does the degree of uncertainty affect the result? Specifically, how does the variation between v H and v L influence the settlement range and each player's expected profit? To answer this question, one can hold constant the expected value of employment, pv H þ (1 ÿ p)v L and vary the difference between v H and v L . This yields the result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. As the variance in the two possible true values of the worker rises, holding the expected value constant and v L ! 0, the contract zone in FOA shifts to the left. The worker's expected profit falls, whereas the firm's expected profit rises. The contract zone and, therefore, profits are unaffected in CA.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This implies that the firm will benefit from an increase in the variance between the possible worker values. Thus, even with risk-neutral players, as the firm faces increased uncertainty in terms of the residual payout, it will receive higher expected profits in FOA. Note further that this occurs despite the fact that the firm's optimal bid remains fixed at zero; it is the worker who is expected to ask less in FOA as this variance rises due to the increased likelihood that the arbitrator's preferred wage is near zero. This benefit to the firm does not occur in CA.
Robustness over the Distribution Choice
The results presented above all assume a uniform distribution for the arbitrator's preferences. If this assumption is relaxed, will FOA continue to favor the firm by pushing the contract zone to the left? Since FOA generally results in a contract zone that is centered about the median as opposed to the mean, the question lies in the relative position of the median and the mean in the convolution of the two distributions. Any combination of distributions in which the median ex post lies below the mean implies that FOA favors the firm relative to CA.
15 If both the low and high distributions are symmetric and span the entire range of the support, then the median of the combined distribution will be shifted down relative to the weighted average of the original means; this is true regardless of their shape. Intuitively, the lower range of the support is possible in both cases and, therefore, occurs with greater frequency than do the higher values. Although this condition is not necessary, it is sufficient. Thus, in the basic setup of our game in which the arbitrator chooses from a symmetric distribution over a support [a, b] or over a higher support [a, b þ d], the median of the convoluted distribution lies to the left of the mean regardless of the shape of the distribution; in this case, FOA will always favor the firm relative to CA.
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It is also possible that if the entire range of support is not covered in the original distributions, the median will still fall to the left of the mean. For example, if the arbitrator is only willing to consider the middle 20% of the value (i.e., at most a 60/40 split in either direction) and these ranges overlap, then it is still true that the median is less than the mean. This happens, once again, as values in the lower end occur with greater probability than those only occurring in the upper distribution. Consider the case of uniform distributions over v L ¼ $80 and v H ¼ $120 with p ¼ 0.5. Under a 60/40 rule, the arbitrator is going to be drawing randomly from either the interval [32, 48] or the interval [48, 72] . The median of this distribution is 48 whereas the mean is 50.
Summary of Theoretical Results
The results above inform us about the position of the contract zone in both FOA and CA under various cases. Specifically, FOA results in a contract zone that moves in the favor of the employer relative to CA, and as the variance rises, this movement is magnified. Thus, theory indicates that FOA favors firms relative to workers, and the more uncertainty that exists surrounding employee value, the greater this effect becomes.
When arbitration is available, the contract zone always exists and has the same width (which is equal to the sum of court costs); when there is NoA option, the width of the contract zone is greater. Although theory predicts 100% settlement in any case with symmetric information and the existence of a contract zone, empirical studies have found lower agreement rates when the contract zone is smaller.
17 Consequently, NoA should produce the most settlement. However, between CA and FOA, theory predicts no differences in settlement rates. Not only do we know that 100% settlement does not occur but also previous work has shown that FOA has tended to perform more poorly. By manipulating the position of the contract zone as both the variance and arbitration mechanism are altered, we are able to isolate specific reasons for the failure to settle and the relative performance of FOA versus CA. Specifically, are players bidding within the contract zone and simply failing to coordinate, or are players not responding to the contract zone's position? How does the choice of FOA versus CA affect the answer to those questions? The use of controlled laboratory experiments will allow us to use the movements in contract zones identified in Section 2 to address these questions.
16. Symmetry is not necessary, but if the median lies to the right of the mean in the original distributions while the weighted average necessarily shifts the median down relative to the mean, it is possible for it to still lie to the right.
17. See Currie and McConnell (1991) and Babcock et al. (1995) .
Experimental Design
Having established in Sections 2 and 3 a theoretical framework for behavior when the total value of employment is unknown, the article now turns to evaluating observed behavior in this setting. Although contract disputes occur quite frequently in the naturally occurring economy, the data from such disputes are incomplete at best. For example, the distribution of the arbitrator's belief about a fair wage, Y, is not known. Further, the potential sizes of the contract value v H and v L may not be observable. Additionally, the costs of arbitration, c w and c f are not public. A controlled laboratory on the other hand is ideally suited to explore the impact on behavior of arbitration when the value of employment is unknown. Using laboratory techniques, factors such as the distribution of the arbitrators wage belief, costs, the bargaining procedure, and the potential sizes of the value of employment can be controlled, and complete information can be gathered at each stage of negotiations. Not only will the laboratory allow us to control for these important factors but also based on the theory we are able to identify parameter choices that control for arbitration mechanism, variance, and position of the contract zone separately. Specifically, our parameter choices will create cases in which (a) the mechanism varies but the position of the contract zone is (nearly) identical across mechanisms, (b) the mechanism varies shifting the FOA contract zone position, and (c) changing the variance shifts the FOA contract zone but not the CA contract zone. These controls allow us to isolate the role of the mechanism, the position of the contract zone, or the variance itself independent of its impact on contract zone position.
For this purpose, a blocked 3 Â 2 experimental design is used. The first dimension is the dispute mechanism available to the parties; a NoA baseline, CA, or FOA. This dimension is measured between subjects. In the experiments, a worker and a firm bargain over a wage when the value of employment is unknown and can take on two potential values; the probability each potential value is 50%, p ¼ 0.5. The theoretical model presented in Section 2 indicates that conditioned on the expected value of the gains from employment, the variance interacts with the wage level when FOA is used. Therefore, a second dimension that varies the sizes of v H and v L and measures the impact within subjects is included. In one environment v L ¼ $80 and v H ¼ $120. An equal split of the expected gains from employment 18 is achieved at a wage of $50. Such a wage would yield both the worker and the firm a positive profit regardless of which v i 2 fv L , v H g is realized. Therefore, this environment is referred to as ''positive.'' For the ''negative'' environment, we let v L ¼ $40 and v H ¼ $160. Since the expected value of employment remains at $100, a wage of $50 continues to equally split the expected benefit. However, if v L is the realized value of the contract, then the 18. Numerous experimental studies of bargaining games have found that subjects tend to divide surplus relatively equally. This behavior regularity for equal division has led previous experimental investigations of arbitration to take steps to reduce the likelihood of such an outcome. firm loses money. 19 The positive environment corresponds to a relatively lowvariance environment, whereas the negative environment is a higher variance environment. For both forms of arbitration, CA and FOA, c w and c f were set equal to $15 (or 30% of the total value), which was common information to both parties. 20 There was no cost for incompatible proposals in the NoA treatment. Table 1 gives the contract zone for each cell in the 3 Â 2 design.
In each session, subjects made decisions in both environments using a blocked ordering; that is, half the sessions in each treatment began with the positive environment and then switched to the negative environment while the order was reversed for the other half of the sessions. For consistency, one random sequence of employment value realizations was constructed and then used in all sessions. Also, for intersession consistency, the experiments were computerized, 21 and all subjects saw the same examples regardless of role or initial environment.
The experiments exactly followed steps 0-4 presented Section 2. Bargaining is done via a game in which each party simultaneously submits a wage proposal that serves as both an offer to the other party and the minimum surplus that the proposer is willing to accept. Each subject's screen displayed the two potential values of employment as two parallel lines from 0 to v H and v L . The worker and the firm submit bids a and b, respectively, by positioning a marker on their own screen and then clicking on a button. Figure 1 shows this decision screen for a worker and a firm. If the two proposals are compatible (i.e., a b), then the wage is set at aþb 2 , and the profits to both parties are then computed. In this case both subjects are told a, b, the wage, their own realized payoff, and the realized payoff of their counterpart. Although this is a simplified model of 19. It is possible that the potential for a negative payoff influences behavior in the negative environment. However, in order to shift the FOA contract zone far enough to the left for a meaningful behavioral comparison across environments, the payoff variance must be sufficiently great, leading to the possibility of realized losses.
20. Van Boening (2001, 2004) use arbitration costs ranging anywhere from 9% up to 80% of the total value to be split, depending upon the realizations of information in their models. Spier (1992) finds standard litigation costs to be 50% of the dispute value, and arbitration costs are typically much lower than litigation.
21. Neutral language was used throughout the experiments. Terms such as worker, firm, wage, and arbitration were not used in the laboratory. These terms are used here for ease of exposition. A copy of the directions is available at http://comp.uark.edu/;cdeck/expinfo.htm.
bargaining, such a model captures the important features of the situation, is straightforward to explain, and is easy for subjects to understand.
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Proposals were restricted to be between 0 and v H . Thus, it is possible that an agreed upon wage could result in a loss to the firm if the actual amount of surplus turned out to be less than the agreed upon wage. To help assist subjects in understanding how their decisions impacted payoffs, each party was shown a table that listed the payoffs for both parties conditioned on v i for the subject's wage proposal. This table is shown on the upper right-hand portion of the decision screens in Figure 1 .
If on the other hand the proposals are incompatible (i.e., b < a), the game proceeds to step 4, without subject knowledge of the realized value from employment, v i , but with knowledge of the other's proposal, a or b. In the NoA baseline, both sides are told that both parties received a payoff of zero, whereas in CA, the arbitrator randomly determines the allocation. As is explained to the subjects, the arbitrator knows the realized value to employment, v i , and draws Y from f i ; U[0, v i ]. 23 The role of the arbitrator is performed by the computer which makes a random draw based upon the appropriate distribution; it is clear to the subjects, therefore, that the bids do not impact the arbitrator's preferences. The wage is then set equal to Y, and both subjects are informed of the wage and the profits to both parties. As described in Section 2.3, when the proposals are incompatible under FOA, the worker is required to submit b and the firm is required to submit a. Subjects type in these final offers on another part of their 22. Other simple bargaining structures such as the standard ultimatum game give power to the proposer and thus make point predictions. More complex bargaining structures are more difficult to explain and often have a sequence of events, both of which can lead to greater variability in the experimental results.
23. The uniform distribution was explained to subjects by telling them that any allocation between 0 and v i including 0 and v i are equally likely to be selected. screen with the only restriction being that a, b 2 f0, 1, . . ., v H g. Y is then drawn from f i , and the wage is set equal to either a or b depending on which is closer to Y. After the arbitration process determines the wage, both sides are informed of the wage, their own payoff, and their counterpart's payoff. Only the value of a or b selected as the wage is reported to the subjects. Also, Y is not revealed. Although it is conceivable that a < b, suggesting agreement, the arbitrator is still forced to select one of the two second-round proposals.
Each laboratory session involved 10 subjects. The subjects were all undergraduate students at a state university, who were recruited from classes and from a database of volunteers for previous unrelated experiments. 24 Half the subjects were randomly assigned the role of a worker, and the other half were assigned the role of a firm. Each subject read computerized directions that were role and dispute mechanism specific. Once a subject finished the directions, the subject was required to complete a quiz. This paper handout served to verify that all subjects understood the information on their screen, how the wage would be determined by compatible proposals, and the process of resolving disputes. A copy of this handout is included in Appendix C. Once all subjects had completed the quiz and had a chance to have any remaining questions answered, the experiment began. Each session consisted of 30 bargaining periods. Every period, a worker was randomly and anonymously matched with a firm. The pair then played the bargaining game and went through the arbitration process if necessary. In a session, only the specific form of dispute resolution for which the subjects had read the directions was available. Once the previous period's results were displayed, the next period began automatically. 25 The first 15 periods were in one environment (positive or negative), and the last half were in the other environment. Subjects did not know the total number of periods or how many periods would be completed within an environment. Upon completion of the experiment, subjects were called individually to receive their payoffs in private. All parameters are denoted in experimental dollars, which were converted into U.S. dollar at the rate of 100 Exp. dollar ¼ 1 U.S. dollar. In addition to their cumulative earnings, each subject was paid a U.S.$5.00 show up fee for participating in the approximately 1-hour-long session. The average payoff for a participant was U.S.$11.42, excluding the show up fee.
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In total, 120 unique student subjects participated in 1 of 12 sessions. This yields four replicates in each of the six cells of the experimental design. Table 2 provides the treatment and blocking order for each session. 24. The use of undergraduate students is the norm in experimental economics. However, as with any empirical study, one must be cautious in extrapolating results off the support of the observations. In a study of price bubbles in asset markets, Smith et al. (1988) found that professional traders behaved in a pattern similar to undergraduates. See Harrison and List (2004) for a discussion of artifactual experiments comparing subject pools.
25. All bargaining pairs learned their results simultaneously in order to prevent subjects from being able to determine with whom they were matched in a given period.
26. This earnings average is comparable to other experimental studies. Of course one must be cautious in extrapolating to other size stakes, but theory is silent on such effects.
27. This table is not chronological. The treatments assigned to each session were randomly chosen.
Experimental Results
The data consist of 1800 wage proposals made by workers and 1800 wage proposals made by firms. 28 Additionally, the data include a and b each time a dispute was settled by FOA, Y every time either form of arbitration was employed, as well as the wage if established. To control for the impact of learning, analysis is restricted to the last 10 periods in an environment. The results of the experiments are presented as a series of findings.
The first finding examines the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms on the likelihood that two parties reach agreement in the initial bargaining phase. Support. Given previous work by Ashenfelter et al. (1992) and Dickinson (2004) , we test the null hypothesis of no-treatment effect against the alternative hypothesis that NoA has the greatest agreement rate and FOA has the lowest agreement rate. Based on a Page test (test statistic ¼ 28, p-value of 0.0278), we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the ordered alternative.
29 n
In the bargaining game with NoA, all wages between 0 and 100 are in the contract zone and hence can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. In this case, the parties have a relatively large range of choices over which to coordinate behavior. Both CA and FOA restrict the contract zone, the range of outcomes over which the parties should bargain initially. Thus, the first part of the finding 28. The data are available at http://comp.uark.edu;cdeck/expinfo.htm./ 29. The nonparametric Page test allows for a comparison of multiple-ordered alternatives. To conduct this test data from the two sessions that had the same environment, order and treatment were combined. The value 28 is the most extreme for the Page test statistic when there are three treatments and two blocks (environment orderings) of observations. is consistent with previous empirical studies that suggest that larger contract zones will generate greater settlement. The poorer performance of FOA relative to CA is also consistent with previous experimental studies. Having replicated these relationships, the analysis now turns to determine if the increased dispute rates observed under arbitration are due to a failure to coordinate within the smaller contract zones or rather a failure of the arbitration mechanism to restrict proposals. Table 3 gives the number of proposals outside the contract zone. Finding 2 evaluates the treatment effect.
Finding 2. A substantial number of proposals lie outside the contract zone for both workers and firms when a dispute mechanism is available. More proposals are outside the contract zone in FOA than in CA; this result is largely driven by the behavior of workers.
Support. In all, 54% of all proposals in CA and 70% of all proposals in final offer lie outside the contract zone. By contrast only 5% of wage proposals lie outside the, albeit larger, contract zone in the NoA treatment. To compare contract zone violations between CA and FOA, we use a Mack-Skillings test. Based upon this nonparametric test, we reject the null hypothesis of no-treatment effect (test statistic ¼ 4.8, p-value ¼ 0.0556).
30 This same analysis was conducted for workers and firms separately. For workers, the Mack-Skillings test statistic is again 4.8, indicating that workers' violations are affected by the arbitration mechanism. For firms, the test statistic is 1.2, thus the null hypothesis of notreatment effect cannot be rejected at any standard level of significance. n 30. The Mack-Skillings test controls for the environment order and allows for the general twosided alternative hypothesis. The Page test was used in support of Finding 1 as previous studies have consistently found a treatment ordering, suggesting an ordered alternative hypothesis. The test statistic of 4.8 is the most extreme value for a Mack-Skillings test when there are two treatments and two blocks (environment orders) with two observations per block.
Finding 2 establishes that individual behavior does not conform to the predictions of the contract zone under FOA and CA and suggests that the reason for FOA's poorer settlement rates may be the result of worker's failing to respond to the position of the contract zone. We next focus on what impact, if any, the method of dispute resolution does have on the magnitude of wage proposals. This analysis is presented separately for workers and firms. Support for both findings relies on estimating a mixed-effects model, where the wage proposal is dependent upon the arbitration mechanism, the environment, and the ordering of the environments observed by the subject. 31 For workers we estimate
where Ask ij is the wage that subject j in session i asked to receive. The variables FOA and CA are dummies for the arbitration method, and PEnv is a dummy variable for the positive environment. FOA Â PEnv and CA Â PEnv are interaction terms that allow the arbitration mechanism effect to differ by environment. Order is a dummy variable that captures the effect of the order in which the environments were presented to the subjects. 32 The estimation for the bids placed by firms, denoted Bid ij , is based upon the same independent variables. Finding 3. CA has no impact on the average wage proposal of workers in either environment. FOA has no effect on average initial proposals in the negative environment but lowers average wage proposals in the positive environment.
Support. The empirical support for this finding is provided in Table 4,   33 which reports estimation of the mixed-effects model with 1200 observations of worker asks. Based upon the reported estimation, CA has no impact on the mean wage proposal in either environment. Formally, the hypothesis that / 2 ¼ 0 cannot be rejected at standard levels and neither can the hypothesis that / 2 þ / 6 ¼ 0. The impact of FOA is discernable from / 1 and / 5 . As the negative environment serves as the baseline, the failure to reject / 1 indicates that FOA does not impact the average wage proposal of workers in this environment. However, the hypothesis that FOA has no impact in positive environment, / 5 þ / 3 ¼ 0, can be rejected in favor of the one-sided alternative at the 95% confidence level. n 31. This repeated-measures technique estimates a fixed effect for the treatment variables while allowing for a random effect for each session. See Longford (1993) for a discussion of this model, which is often used in experimental sciences.
32. Order takes the value 1 if subjects made decisions in the negative environment first and the value 0 otherwise 33. S-Plus was used to generate the estimations reported in Tables 4 and 5 . The degrees of freedom for the treatments fixed during a session equals 8, the number of sessions minus the number of fixed conditions (the three mechanisms plus the order). The degrees of freedom for the other parameters equals 1185, the 1200 observations from the last 10 periods in each environment minus the number of sessions (each of which has a random effect) minus the number of conditions which varied over the experiment (the interaction of the environment with the mechanisms).
Average worker proposals lie inside the contract zone except in the negative environment with FOA. Based upon the mixed-effects model estimation, the average wage proposal 34 of a worker is 53 ¼ / 0 þ / 4 /2, except in the case of wage proposals in the positive environment when final offer is used to resolve disputes. The point estimate of 53 lies near the center of the contract zone for both NoA and CA in both environments but is above the contract zone for FOA in the negative environment. For the NoA baseline treatment and the CA treatment, this lack of responsiveness to the environment is predicted by a comparison of the contract zones. However, we find that under FOA, subjects do not behave according to the theoretical shift of the contract zone. In the positive environment, the contract zones are similar for CA and FOA, yet the positive environment has a negative effect on average wage proposal in FOA. By contrast, the negative environment shifts the contract zone downward relative to CA, but observed proposals are statistically similar between the two treatments. This indicates that it is the failure of FOA to generate proposals that responds to movements in the contract zone as predicted. It is worth noting that the hypotheses of no-order effect, / 4 ¼ 0 can be rejected at the 95% confidence level in favor of the one-sided alternative that / 4 > 0, implying that the wage proposals of workers are greater if the initial environment is the negative one.
Although average worker proposals conform to the predictions of the contract zone in five of the six cases, there is considerable variation in wage proposals as suggested by Finding 2. Figure 2 shows the distribution of worker proposals by treatment and environment. Apparent from this figure is this increase in variance associated with both forms of arbitration regardless of environment. Also shown in Figure 2 are the distributions of firm proposals. With respect to firm behavior, both forms of arbitration shift the distribution of wage offers downward, a result made explicit in Finding 4. 34. This estimate (and others of average wage proposals) is adjusted to reflect the fact that order was significantly different than 0 and that half the workers and firms had each environment ordering. Thus, added to each point estimate is / 4 /2 for workers and / 4 /2 for firms. A value of 0 is used for effects where the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 0. For example, the point estimate for worker bids in the NoA baseline in the positive environment is
Finding 4. Relative to NoA, CA and FOA significantly lower the average initial proposal of firms. Irrespective of the dispute resolution mechanism, firm offers are unaffected by the environment. While this is predicted in CA as the contract zone does not move, this is true for FOA despite the fact that the contract zone shifts.
Support. Table 5 reports the results of estimating a mixed-effects model using the 1200 observations of firm bids. The hypothesis u 1 ¼ 0 can be rejected as can the hypothesis u 2 ¼ 0 at the 95% confidence level in favor of a onesided alternative that the arbitration mechanism lowers mean wage proposals. The lack of sensitivity to the environment by firms in a given treatment is evidenced by p-values in the two-sided test of 0.1258 on u 3 , 0.1603 on u 5 , and 0.1369 on u 6 for the NoA, CA, and FOA treatments, respectively. n From Table 5 , the average wage offer by firms in the NoA baseline under either environment is 62 ¼ u 0 þ u 4 /2, which is within the contract zone. Given that the average ask by a worker is 53 in these situations, it is not surprising that agreement rates are high when NoA mechanisms can be used to solve disputes. The average firm offer under CA is approximately 47 under both environments, which is below the 53 average asking wage of workers. This lack of sensitivity to the variance in the potential surplus by firms in CA is consistent with the lack of movement in the contract zone. Although both parties are on average operating in the contract zone, there is a clear difficulty in coordinating behavior. Further, as evidence by Figure 2 , there is a considerable variation and skewness in firm offers. Under FOA, the average firm offer is estimated to be 41 under both environments, even though there is a clear shifting of the contract zone between the two environments. Although 41 is in the contract zone for both environments, it is at the high end of the range in the negative environment and near the lower end in the positive environment. This apparent generosity of firms using FOA in the negative environment (average proposals near the upper end of the contract zone) does not lead to high agreement rates in this situation as workers are requesting still higher wages, as discussed in Finding 3. As with the workers, there is an order effect (u 4 6 ¼ 0). Again, the data show that wage proposals are greater if the initial environment is the negative one.
Once again, subjects behave more consistently with expectations in CA than in FOA. In particular, variance changes do not directly appear to be the source of behavioral anomalies. Rather, it is the shifting in the contract zone as a result (a phenomenon which only occurs in FOA) that seems to generate bidding outside the contract zone. Specifically, workers fail to respond to the shifts that take place in FOA as variance changes.
Discussion of Results
The support for the model predictions is mixed. In general, firms behave in a manner consistent with the theory while workers fail to respond to the movement in the contract zone in FOA. As described by Smith (1989, 168) , ''the most productive knowledge-building attitude is to be skeptical of both the theory and the evidence.''. A common concern with laboratory experiments is that the theory is too complex to be utilized by the subjects. 35 Although this is a valid concern especially for theory testing, the focus of this research is on comparing alternative arbitration mechanisms. The level of sophistication in naturally occurring settings is not clear. For example, in baseball many players 35. This is related to the discussion in footnote 24 concerning the use of undergraduate subjects.
only go thorough arbitration a few times. When FOA as applied to Major League Baseball was analyzed empirically by Farmer et al. (2004) , they found that workers consistently overbid relative to their merits while firms did not, and as a result, they received lower salaries than would be warranted by their statistics. This is precisely the pattern of behavior that we are observing in our laboratory experiments.
Given that the deviation from theory that we find in our experiments corresponds to a similar deviation observed in real-world arbitration proceedings, it is an important research question to investigate the source of this deviation. Departure from theory is a puzzle throughout the law and economics literature. Why do parties continue with disputes when settling within the contract zone is Pareto optimal? Why has FOA been consistently outperformed by CA in previous experiments when theory offers no explanation for such an outcome. Investigating the source of such deviations is essential to developing better models of how these mechanisms perform in order to make sound policy recommendations.
One possible explanation for the workers' failure to adjust to the shifting contract zone in the negative environment is risk aversion.
36 Specifically, if both firms and workers are risk averse, then the contract zone will expand correspondent to the certainty equivalent, thereby encouraging settlement (Farber and Katz 1979) . However, given that firms as the residual claimant face greater risk than workers, the contract zone shifts more in the favor of the workers, thereby mitigating the shift in favor of the firm generated by FOA. Moreover, it is in the negative environment in which firms face the greatest downside risk that the workers fail to lower their wage demands as should be expected with FOA. It may simply be the case that they are responding to the higher upper bound of the contract zone that is generated by firm risk aversion. An alternative explanation consistent with what we observe is that both parties focus on different aspects of the problem. Firms as residual claimants may be concerned with the minimum earnings which are based on v L , which falls with an increase in variance as did observed proposals by firms. Workers who are receiving a fixed payment could be fixated on their potential worth, v H , which increases with variance as did firm proposals.
One place where risk attitudes should be directly revealed in this experiment is in the submission of final offers to the arbitrator after bargaining has failed. Here the risk-neutral model with the auxiliary hypothesis of rationality produces a unique prediction for each type of bargainer. Specifically, firms should submit b ¼ 0 regardless of the environment, and workers should submit a ¼ 96 in the positive environment and a ¼ 64 in the negative environment. Table 6 reports the average a and b by session and environment.
Without exception, the average b submitted by firms exceeded the riskneutral prediction and the average a submitted by workers was below the relevant risk-neutral predictions. This is consistent with the subjects in exhibiting 36. There is an ongoing debate about measuring risk attitudes in the laboratory. Duncan and Isaac (2000) demonstrate the problems associated with measuring risk, whereas Rabin (2000) questions the existence of risk aversion over relatively small stakes. some degree of risk aversion. No formal hypothesis tests are needed to identify that behavior is not in strict accordance with the completely rational risk-neutral theory. Further, one should note that the observations summarized in Table  6 are not independent, and thus standard t-tests are inappropriate for hypothesis testing.
Conclusion
Arbitration is widely used to settle disputes. This has led researchers to study arbitration in various situations from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. While theoretical results provide no insight into whether a shrinking contract zone enhances settlement by making coordination easier or encourages conflict by lessening the possible settlement choices, empirical results have consistently found that arbitration leads to an increase in the frequency of disputes. We find in a controlled laboratory experiment that in shrinking the contract zone arbitration does appear to discourage settlement; this finding informs the debate regarding the size of the contract zone and the likelihood of settlement. Thus far, this body of research has focused on the situation where both parties' payoffs are deterministic. However, this is not always the case; instead, an agreement often leaves one side with a payoff best described as a lottery. This article explores this distinct bargaining context that occurs frequently in naturally occurring economy. The theoretical analysis shows the typical result that both FOA and CA restrict the contract zone down to a range the width of the arbitration costs. However, the contract zone in FOA is more favorable to the player receiving the lottery payoff relative to the contract zone under CA. Returning to the often-cited example of determining a baseball player's wage, this result means that regardless of the possible benefits to hiring the player, the agreeable wages are lower under FOA than under CA; despite neutrality of the arbitrator, FOA favors the ball club over the player.
A second theoretical finding is that as the variance between the possible outcomes rises, that is, the risk faced by the party, whose payoff is a lottery, rises, the contract zone in final offer shifts in favor of this residual claimant; under CA it does not change. In other words, the wider the range of the possible values of a worker to a firm, the more FOA benefits the firm. Note that both these theoretical results are driven by the informational setting and exist for risk-neutral parties. An empirical analysis of bargaining behavior in this uncertain value context is also presented. Due to the incompleteness of naturally occurring field data, the behavioral observations were collected in the laboratory where factors such as the belief of the arbitrator, the value to be divided, the costs of arbitration, and the form of arbitration could be controlled. Using a blocked design, the impact of CA and FOA as dispute mechanisms was explored in two payoff environments. In the positive or low-variance environment, an equal split of the expected amount to be divided resulted in positive payoffs to both parties regardless of the realized value, whereas the same equal division of the expected value could result in a loss for the lottery payoff party in the negative or high-variance environment.
The experimental results indicate that in general the central tendencies of the wage proposals lie inside the contract zone. However, there is considerable variation in individual behavior, potentially due to risk preferences on the part of the subjects. Even though wages tend to be centered in the contract zone, considerable coordination problems remain, thereby preventing settlement. While both FOA and CA reduce the size of the contract zone, more disputes actually occur when these dispute resolution mechanisms are in place. Consistent with previous findings, final offer leads to the greatest number of disputes.
The experimental evidence suggests that a comparison of contract zones is not sufficient to predict behavioral shifts. Further, firms and workers are focusing on different aspects of the decision task. The existence of arbitration leads to lower firm wage proposals regardless of how the center of the contract zone is affected. On average, workers tend to request wages near the center of the contract zone under both CA and NoA. But workers in final offer ask for lower wages relative to non-final-offer workers when the centers of the contract zones are similar. Yet, when the contract zone shifts left under final offer, workers do not lower their wage demands. Overall, the difference in agreement rates in FOA and CA can be attributed to workers' failure to respond to the shifts in the contract zone that take place in FOA.
Appendix C: Compression Handouts Completed by Subjects Prior to Beginning Experiment 37 37. The original handouts contained a typo ''hour hand'' instead of ''your hand.'' The error is reproduced in the appendix to provide the reader with a completely accurate description of the procedures, which is critical for interpreting the findings of any study.
